Introduction
The Montagovian paradigm of natural language semantics relies on the two crucial assumptions that (a) the meaning of a sentence can exhaustively be described by means of its truth conditions, and (b) this meaning can be built up compositionally from its parts. Unfortunately, empirical observations force us to the conclusion that the mentioned assumptions cannot be true at the same time, as soon we shift our attention to discourse phenomena. This is exempli ed by the discourses in (1):
(1) a. Peter came in. He wore a hat.
b. John came in. He wore a hat.
The second sentence in (1a) is true just in case that Peter wore a hat, while the corresponding sentence in (1b) is equivalent to John wore a hat. These two sentences are syntactically identical, at least as far as their surface is concerned. Hence they have the same parts, and, ceteris paribus, they should have the same meaning. Nevertheless their truth conditions di er.
This and related problems led several authors to the conclusion that we have to give up the principle of compositionality in the strict Montagovian sense. Most in uentally, Kamp 1981 and Heim 1982 propose that there is an additional level of representation relating syntactic structure and semantic interpretation. In their systems, syntactic structure has to undergo a process of \DRS-construction" (Kamp) or \LF-construal" (Heim) , and it is the output of this process that is interpreted compositionally in terms of truth conditions. Stokhof 1991a and Stokhof 1991b choose the other direction. They point out that the principle of compositionality can be maintained as soon as we do without the assumption that sentence meanings coincide with truth conditions. Instead they propose that sentences (and discourses) denote transition function over information states. These transition functions are connected to truth conditions, but in an indirect way. The advantage of this strategy is a methodological rather than an empirical one, since compositional and nonrepresentational semantic theories are generally more restrictive in their predictive power.
It is the aim of this paper to extend the coverage of the dynamic paradigm to phenomena involving the focus sensitive operator only. Constructions involving this item show a dependency on linguistic context reminiscent to the behavior of anaphora. Existing approaches address this phenomenon by weakening the compositionality of interpretation in several respects. Instead we will try to outline a dynamic theory of the semantics of this constructions that preserves compositionality both on the sentence and on the text level.
In both cases, the universal quanti cation is restricted by the non-focused part (the \background") of the sentence (is wise). Besides this, there is an additional restrictor in (4b), corresponding to the argument of the wh-word in the question (Athenian). Hence it is quite obvious that the truth conditions of a sentence involving only somehow depend on the question the sentence is an answer to.
We will proceed as follows. In the subsequent section, the proposal made in Rooth 1992 { which can be seen as a kind of paradigmatic approach in a static setting { is brie y presented and discussed. In section 4 we develop a dynamic system that covers both interrogative and declarative sentences. Finally, in section 5 it is shown that this system is able to account for the kind of dependency between questions and answers illustrated above. 3 Rooth 1992 In the sense of the discussion above, Rooth's proposal can be seen on a par with Heim 1982 . As the feature that matters most for our purposes, he assumes that it is not surface structure that serves as input for semantic interpretation, but that there is an intermediate level of \Logical Form". The proposed LF for the sentence under discussion is roughly as in (5) This is not the proper place to discuss the details and merits of Rooth's semantics of focus in general. It is only important that the LF contains { besides the overt material { an additional item \?" that is adjoined to the sister constituent of only by means of the operator \ ". ? is interpreted as a restriction of the domain of the universal quanti cation induced by only, such that we end up with an interpretation as it is given in (6).
(6) 8x(C(x)^wise(x) ! x = s) \?" is considered to be a kind of anaphor that is interpreted as the free variable C above. The value of this variable is { according to Rooth 1992 { determined by a variety of factors that are external to the compositional interpretative machinery. Although he does not address comparable examples directly, it is very much in his spirit to assume that ? should be coindexed with the wh-phrase of the preceding question in (2) and (3) by means of some pragmatic mechanism.
More generally, to achieve the appropriate truth conditions for constructions involving only in a static setup, we are forced to assume that (a) there is at least one level of representation distinct from surface structure that serves as input for the compositional interpretation, and (b) truth conditions, i.e. meaning is not completely determined by lexicon and syntax but relies on pragmatic processes. In view of this fact it strikes me a fruitful enterprise to develop a semantical analysis that avoids these stipulations, even if we have to give up the equation meaning = truthconditions. More in detail, our aim is to get rid of any kind of syntactic placeholders like the anaphora ? in Rooth's proposal to derive the meaning of constructions involving only fully compositionally, i.e. without making reference to pragmatics.
relies on the assumption that each question determines a unique proposition that constitutes the exhaustive true answer to the question. 2 This is best illustrates by an example. Take some simple yes-no question like (7) Is it raining?
If it is raining, the unique exhaustive true answer is the proposition It is raining, and in case it is not raining, this answer is constituted by It is not raining. This can easily be expressed in a two-sorted extensional type theory:
This expression denotes a proposition in every possible world, although it is not necessarily the same proposition in di erent worlds. To get a xed semantic object, we have to -abstract over the world of evaluation w 0 . According to Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, the meaning of a question is just this new object { the \concept of the true answer".
It is obvious that this denotes an equivalence relation on the set of possible worlds. Hence a question de nes an exhaustive partition on this set into a set mutually exclusive proposition. In the example above, these are just the propositions It is raining and It is not raining. Generally, the elements of the partition are those propositions that constitute exhaustive { but not necessarily true { answers to the question.
Information States and Updates
The common strategy for dynamisizing a certain static semantics runs roughly as follows: If sentences statically denote objects from some domain , the corresponding dynamic formulae denote functions F : ! . Since we want to deal with question-answer sequences in a single dynamic system, we are faced with a serious problem. Declarative sentences statically denote propositions, i.e. sets of possible worlds, while interrogatives denote relations on possible worlds or { equivalently { sets of propositions. Hence there are two candidates for update-denotations: functions from propositions to propositions or functions from relations to relations. By \generalizing to the worst case", we adopt the latter option. Formulae of the dynamic logic to be de ned below denote functions over information states (or simply \states"), where states are equivalence relations on possible worlds.
Let a nonempty set W of possible be given. We de ne:
De nition 1 (Information States) is an information state i W W and is an equivalence relation.
This immediately gives us a partial order on the set of states, corresponding to the intuitive notion of informativity. The minimal and the maximal elements of this order are called 1 (state of ignorance) and 0 (absurd state) respectively. equivalent, such that the choice does nor matter too much. 2. Counterexamples to this claim like free-choice questions are ignored throughout this paper.
De nition 2 (Informativity)
Note that these relations may be partial, i.e. their domains may be proper subsets of W. Hence each state non-trivially determines a certain proposition, which can be thought of as the factual knowledge shared by the conversants.
De nition 3 (Domain of a state) D( ) = def fwjw wg
Since each equivalence relation uniquely de nes a partition on its domain, it is worth considering the structure of the space of partitions determined by the space of states.
De nition 4 (Partitions)
Let ; be information states. P = def ffvjv wgjw 2 Wg n f;g P v d P , def P P P v i P , def P = P ^8x 2 P 9y 2 P : x y Equivalence classes of possible worlds can be thought of as epistemic alternatives in a certain stage of conversation. Information growth can a ect these alternatives in two ways. Either some of them are eliminated { this is covered by v d { or they are made more ne-grained without changing the domain of the equivalence relation itself (v i ). The latter corresponds to the e ect of asking a question, while the former is the purpose of declarative utterances. 3 The notion of informativity given above covers both ways of information growth.
Fact 1
For all states and , it holds that: There are only two updates that are both declarative and interrogative, namely the identity function and the constant function that always gives 0 as output. On the other hand, there are many updates that are neither declarative nor interrogative. Nevertheless, according to Fact 2, every update can be decomposed into an interrogative and a declarative one (in this order).
Since interrogative and declarative sentences denote di erent kinds of objects statically, there are two pairs of operators that switch between static and dynamic meanings.
De nition 7 (Up-Arrow and Down-Arrow)
Let be an information state, p a proposition, q a static question denotation, and u an update. Fact 4 For all states and propositions p, it holds that:
8x(x 2 P ^x \ p 6 = ; ! x \ p 2 P "dp( ) )
4.3 The Semantics of ULQA Having developed the necessary ontological background, we can start de ne a simple language that serves to reason about the described kind of updates. The syntax of ULQA is just the syntax of rst order logic without functions symbols and with identity, with the single extension that there is a one-place propositional operator \?" that makes formulae out of formulae. For convenience, we take^; :; !, and 8
as logical constants and the other connectives as abbreviations in the usual way.
A model for ULQA consists of an individual domain and a collection of classical interpretation functions (= possible worlds).
De nition 8 (Model)
A model M for ULQA is a triple hE; W; Fi, where E is a denumerable in nite set, W is non-empty, and F is a function that assigns a rst-order interpretation function based on E to every member of W.
In the de nition of the semantics of ULQA, we follow common practise in writing ] g instead of k k g ( ) in case denotes an update. By g e=x] we mean the assignment function g0 that is exactly like g except that it maps x to e.
De nition 9 (The Semantics of ULQA) kck w;g = def F(w)(c) i c is an individual constant kvk w;g = def g(v) i v is a variable P(t 1 ; :::; t n )] g = def \ fhv; wij 8w0(v w0 ! hkt 1 k w0;g ; :::; kt n k w0;g i 2 F(w0)(P))g t The interpretation of atomic formulae is based on the corresponding classical interpretation. Updating a certain state with a classical formula amounts saying that only those alternatives in P survive that are completely included in the set of possible worlds where is true under its classical interpretation. If you consider as an accessibility relation in a Kripke model, the domain of the output is restricted to those worlds where is necessarily true in its static interpretation.
The clauses for dynamic conjunction, dynamic negation, and dynamic implication are familiar from other dynamic systems like Veltman's Update Semantics (cf. Veltman 1990) and do not need much explanation. The semantics of universal quanti cation is a straightforward extrapolation from its classical counterpart.
The key feature of ULQA is the ?-operator. To explain its impact on a rather intuitive level, each proposition in P is splitted into those worlds where the formula in the scope of \?" is true and those where it is false. To put it another way, \? " de nes an equivalence relation by its own, and the output of the update is the intersection of with this relation.
It does not come as a surprise that atomic formulae denote declarative updates and formulae pre xed with \?" interrogative ones. Both properties are preserved under conjunction and universal quanti cation. Being a declarative update is also preserved under negation. Negating an interrogative update, on the other hand, returns you in all non-trivial cases a relation as output that is re exive and symmetric but not transitive. Hence the negation of an interrogative update isn't an update at all in the general case.
The de nitions of truth and entailment in ULQA are fairly standard from related dynamic calculi. A formula is called true in a state if updating the state with the formula does not add information. By abstracting over particular contexts, we get the notion of truth in a model, and by abstracting over models, we can de ne logical truth.
De nition 10 (Truth)
Let M be a model, be an information state and be a formula.
The de nition of the consequence relation between formulae is straightforwardly derived from this truth de nitions. is said to be a consequence of i the output of is always a state where is true.
De nition 11 (Entailment)
Let M be a model, an information state, and ; formulae. 
De nition 12
Let be a ?-free ULQA formula.
By k k ULQA M we refer to the ULQA-interpretation of in the ULQA-model M.
By k k PL1 M we refer to the set of worlds w from W such that k k is true in hE; F(w)i under classical rst-order interpretation.
Fact 5
Let be a ?-free ULQA-formula. It holds in any model M that:
Proof : By induction on the complexity of .
In a sense, the classical interpretation of some ?-free formula , i.e. # d k k ULQA , can be seen as the \context-free" truth-conditional or factual impact of that formula. Hence by updating a state with " d # d k k, we add the factual content of to without a ecting the structure of P .
Fact 6
Let be ?-free.
Immediately from the de nition of " d .
Following common practise, we call " d # d k k the static closure of . Fortunately, the operation of static closure can be expressed in the object language, as far as ?-free formulae are concerned.
Fact 7
Let be ?-free. For convenience, we will henceforth abbreviate \? ^ " with \"# " and we will also refer to it as the \static closure of ". Context will make clear whether we use the term in its syntactic or its semantic sense.
Remember that the union of the propositions in P (the epistemic alternatives) represents the knowledge that is shared by the conversants. Static closure enables us to make statements about this state of factual knowledge in the object language.
Fact 8
Since ULQA is a rst-order language, there cannot be an immediate compositional translation function from English into ULQA. But it is obvious from the de nition of the semantics of ULQA that every semantic object that is the interpretation of some ULQA-formula is at the same time the interpretation of some Ty 2 -formula. Hence ULQA can be seen as a convenient notation of a fragment of Ty 2 . On the other hand, if the translation of a couple of English sentences into Ty 2 are given, it is a technical exercise to develop a Montague-style compositional translation from this fragment of English into Ty 2 . This in mind, I will content myself with stipulating the ULQA-translations of the English sentences under debate since the described procedure would take a lot of space without illuminating anything of particular interest.
The translation of simple clauses with names in the argument positions are straightforward and do not need much explanation.
(10) Socrates is wise ; wise(s) Prima facie, the ?-operator only enables us to form yes-no questions. Nevertheless it is possible to deal with constituent questions appropriately. We start with the observation that a which-question is equivalent to a yes-no-question in the scope of a restricted universal quanti er.
(11) a. Which Athenians are wise?
b. For all Athenians: Is he or she wise?
In contrast to other approaches to the semantics of questions, the interpretations of interrogative and declarative sentences belong to the same logical type, namely updates. Hence there is no problem in quantifying into a question. Hence I assume:
(12) Which Athenians are wise? ; 8x(athenian(x) !?wise(x)) Who-questions can be handled in a similar manner. The only di erence lies in the absence of a restriction to the quanti er.
(13) Who is wise ; 8x:?wise(x)
One of the crucial features of ULQA is the fact that universal quanti cation is { so to speak { automatically contextually restricted. This fact will be illustrated in some length in the subsequent paragraphs. Therefore the translation of onlyconstructions can be kept pretty simple.
(14) Only Socrates is wise ; 8x(wise(x) ! x = s) This strategy is of course an oversimpli cation in some respects, but Krifka 1992 shows convincingly that it is possible to derive corresponding translations of more complex construction involving VP-focus and multiple focus fully compositionally.
Some Properties of ULQA
Let us start with a couple of negative results. First of all, the consequence relation de ned above is not re exive.
Fact 9 (Non-Identity)
There are formulae such that 6 j = As it will turn out, this is not an accident but even a quite desirable feature. An example will be given and discussed below. It is worth noting that identity does hold as far as ?-free formulae are concerned.
Fact 10
Let be ?-free. Then it holds that j = Sketch of proof: The semantics of ULQA can equivalently be rede ned in such a way that formulae denote updates over partitions. Under this perspective, ?-free formulae denote updates that are both eliminative and distributive (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1990) . Hence there is a static interpretation to this fragment such that updating is just intersecting the state with the static meaning. The fact follows then from the idempotence of set intersection.a
For the present discussion, it is more important that we are not enabled to infer from a certain update to its static closure, even if identity holds for this update.
Fact 11
There are formulae such that The static closure of Only Socrates is wise means that Socrates is literally the only wise individual, and this of course cannot be inferred from the utterance of the sentence in a particular context, as (3) shows.
Neither can we infer from a universally quanti ed formula to the static closure of some instance. 4 Fact 12
There are formulae and individual constants a such that 8x: j = (a) 8x: 6 j = "# (a) This is again a desired result, since we don't want to draw the conclusion Zeus is not wise (( If Zeus is wise, then he is Socrates) from Only Socrates is wise under all circumstances. Nevertheless there is a restricted version of the mentioned kind of universal instantiation.
Fact 13
For all ?-free formulae ; and individual constants a, it holds that:
Sketch of proof: P ? (a)] contains only propositions that either entail k (a)k PL1 or k: (a)k PL1 . Among those that make (a) classically true, only those can survive in P ? (a)^8x( ! )] that survive under updating with (a). The premise ensures that these propositions are contained in k (a)k PL1 . Hence if a proposition in P ? (a)^8x( ! )] classically entails (a) , it also entails (a). The conclusion follows by Fact 8 (2).a.
Applied to the example, it follows that we may infer from the utterance of Only Socrates is wise to, say, Plato is unwise provided that Plato's wisdom is under debate in the present state of conversation. To put it another way round, besides the syntactically present restrictor to a universal quanti er, we have the implicit restriction that an individuals being an instance of the restrictor has to be under debate at the current state of conversation. Let me brie y explain why ULQA behaves in this way. A partition corresponding to a state is a collection of sets of worlds, i.e. total rst-order interpretation functions. A set of interpretation functions can be identi ed with a partial function. If all total functions in the set agree about the value of a certain item x, the derived functions assigns this value to x, too. If x receives di erent values under di erent functions in the set, its value under the corresponding partial function is unde ned. Hence an information state can be seen as a set of situations, i.e. partial rst-order models. Asking a question in a certain state extends the domain of the situations in the state. The interpretation of is de ned in any situation in ? ], no matter whether it was de ned in . Hence j =? just if is completely de ned in . A certain individual only falls in the domain of a restricted universal quanti er if it unequivocally either is an instance of the restrictor or it is not. Hence we have an implicit restriction of a quanti er domain given by de nedness. Now let us return to the example. Only Socrates is wise makes a statement about those objects whose wisdom is under debate. Asking the question Which Athenians are wise? brings you in a state where the wisdom of all individuals that are known to be Athenians is under debate. Let us make this slightly more precise. Firstly, we have a restricted version of Modus Ponens together with universal instantiation in ULQA. To give the restrictions precisely, we rstly need an auxiliary de nition.
